Stable generated models for extended generalized logic programs with two kinds of negation provide a semantics for logic programming in its (up to now) most general form. We show that stable generated semantics for extended logic programs coincides with the semantics obtained by translating programs into a minimal partial temporal logic. Then we introduce several new versions of (disjunctive) default logic and show that there are strong (semantical) connections between default logic and logic programming with stable generated models.
Introduction
In knowledge representation, two di erent notions of falsity arise in a natural way. Certain facts are implicitly false by default by not being veri ed in any intended model of the knowledge base. Others are explicitly false by virtue of a direct proof of their falsity, corresponding to their falsi cation in all intended models. These two kinds of falsity in knowledge representation are captured by the two negations, called weak and strong, of partial logic. Logic programs can be viewed as knowledge bases. A logic program consists of facts and deduction rules. Facts correspond to sentences of a suitably restricted language, and deduction rules correspond to non-schematic (Gentzen) sequents. While facts express extensional knowledge, rules express intensional knowledge. A set of facts can be viewed as a database whose semantics is determined by its minimal models. In the case of logic programs, minimal models are not adequate because they are not able to capture`groundedness', i.e. the directedness of rules. Therefore, stable models in the form of certain xpoints have been proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz GL88] as the intended models of normal logic programs. In HW97], this notion was generalized by presenting a de nition which is neither xpoint-based nor dependent on any speci c rule syntax. In the present paper we relate this de nition to the minimal models of systems of temporal partial logic. Furthermore, we investigate the relation between stable generated models and (disjunctive) default logic. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in EH97]. The paper has the following structure. After introducing some basic notation in section 2, we recall the notion of a stable generated model in section 3. Section 4 describes the partial temporal logic and its link with stable generated models. In section 5, we introduce the notion of a generated extension of a disjunctive default theory and investigate the connections with stable generated models.
Preliminaries
A signature = hRel; ExRel; Const; Funi consists of a set of relation symbols Rel, a set of exact relation symbols ExRel Rel, a set of constant symbols Const, and a set of function symbols Fun. If Rel = ExRel we say that the signature is classical. U denotes the set of all ground terms of . For a tuple t 1 ; : : : ; t n we will also writet when its length is of no relevance. The logical functors are ?; ; :;^; _; ; 8; 9, where ?, , and : are called weak, strong negation and classical negation and is called L 0 ( ) (and analogous L 0 c ( )) denotes the corresponding set of sentences (closed formulas). For sublanguages of L( ) formed by means of a subset F of the logical functors, we write L( ; F). With respect to a signature we de ne the following sublanguages: At( ) = L( ; ;), the set of all atomic formulas (also called atoms); Lit( ) = At( ) f a : a 2 At( )g, the set of all literals, and XLit( ) = Lit( ) f?l : l 2 Lit( )g, the set of all extended literals. We introduce the following conventions.
When L L( ) is some sublanguage, L 0 denotes the corresponding set of sentences. If the signature does not matter, we omit it and write, e.g., L instead of L( ).
QF( ) = L 0 ( ; ?; ; _;^; ) denotes the set of all quanti er free sentences over the signature . If hY; <i is a partial order, then Min(Y; <) denotes the set of all minimal elements of Y , i.e. Min(Y; <) = fx 2 Y j there is no x 0 2 Y such that x 0 < xg. Pow(X) or 2 X denotes the power set of the set X. Let = hRel; ExRel; Const; Funi be a signature. A Herbrand -interpretation of L( ) is a set of literals I Lit 0 ( ). Its universe or domain is equal to the set of all ground terms U ; its canonical interpretation of ground terms is the identity mapping. An intepretation I assigns two relations r I andr I , which can be viewed as the truth and falsity extension, to every relation symbol r 2 Rel: r I = ft 2 U a(r) : r(t) 2 Ig, and r I = ft 2 U a(r) : r(t) 2 Ig, where a(r) denotes the arity of r, such that for all exact predicates r 2 ExRel, r I r I = U a(r) . We obtain the model operator Mod c (X) = fI 2 I H c : I j = Xg, and the corresponding consequence relation de ned by X j = c F i Mod c (X) Mod c (F ). Furthermore, denote C 0 (X) = fF j X j = c F and F does not contain weak negation g. Let I; I 0 2 I H 4 be two interpretations. We say that I 0 extends I, resp. I 0 is informationally greater or equal than I, if I I 0 . In sequel we assume that all considered interpretations are coherent (or sometimes positive). Coherent entailment j = c satis es the following property.
Proposition 1 (Coherence Principles) Let be X a set of formulas from L( ), and F a -sentence. Then X j = c F implies X j = c ?F, and X j = c F implies X j = ? F. In HW97] it was shown that stable generated models of disjunctive programs are not always minimal and that there are stable generated models which are also minimal models, but which are not answer sets (see GL90]).
Claim 3 ( HW97]) In the case of (non-disjunctive) extended logic programs, stable generated models agree with answer sets as de ned in GL90].
For disjunctive programs, this is not the case. Proof: Let s 1 := Bs ) G, and Q := (P ? fsg) fBs ) Gg; we show that P st Q.
Let I be a stable generated model of P and (I n ) n< implies that the sets H n (P ) and H n (Q) have the same Herbrand models and hence the same minimal models.
2) Mod s (Q) Mod s (P ). This condition is proved analogously as 1). 2
Corollary 6 There is a nite set R of admissable transformation rules such that for every nite extended general logic program P there exists a program Q in normal form such that P ?! ? R Q. Proof Let P be a generalized program, s 2 P. We carry out the following steps. s ?! fF ) Gg, where F := V Bs, G := W Hs, then F is transformed into a logically equivalent conjunctive normal form F 1 , and G into a logically equivalent conjunctive normal form G 1 = C 1^: : : C n . This can be done by a nite set of admissable transformation rules. By lemma 4 P st (P ? fsg) fF 1 ) G 1 g. By repeated use of the rule described in lemma 5 we get nally a program Q in normal form being stable equivalent to P. 2
Corollary 7 There is a nite set R of admissable transformation rules such that for every extended general logic program P there exists a program Q in normal form such that P st Q. If P is recursively enumerable then Q can be chosen to be recursively enumerable.
Remark: The following rule fF 1 _ F 2 ) Hg ?! fF 1 ) H; F 2 ) Hg cannot be used because this rule, though logically true, does not preserve stability (see, however, Proposition 11).
Example 2 P = fb _ ?b ) bg, and Q = fb ) b; ?b ) bg. 
Minimal Partial Temporal Logic
In this section we will describe a partial temporal semantics for logic programs. The semantics is obtained by translating a logic program into a nonmonotonic partial temporal logic. This logic was rst used to give a temporal semantics to default logic ( ET93] ). The idea behind the temporal framework is that a temporal theory describes the reasoning process of a (nonmonotonic) agent. A number of di erent forms of reasoning were treated in this fashion in ET94]. Although the full temporal logic is more general (it uses S5 models instead of partial models, and temporal operators may be nested), we will describe a simpler variant here that is su cient to give semantics to logic programming. First we will formally introduce minimal partial temporal logic.
De nition 8 (Partial model) A partial model describes which formulas the agent knows (or, has derived) at any point in time. To give an account of the total reasoning process of an agent, we have to describe what the agent knows (has derived) at all points in time. The reasoning of the agent is assumed to start at some point, and continues in a discrete manner: based on what the agent knows, it may apply some (nonmonotonic) inference steps to arrive at a new state of knowledge (described by a partial model), from which it may again apply inference steps. We will take the natural numbers (!) as our ow of time.
De nition 9 (Partial temporal model) A partial temporal model M is a sequence fM t g t2! of partial models. We will assume all partial temporal models are conservative, which means that for all t, we have M t M t+1 . The ordering is extended to partial temporal models by M N , M t N t 8t 2 !
In conservative models, the knowledge of the agent may only increase over time: the agent does not forget and does not revise its knowledge. Whenever we have M N, then this means that M contains less (or equal) knowledge than N, at each time point.
The temporal language in which the reasoning of an agent can be described, is a restricted version of the language introduced in ET93]. For each closed formula 2 L 0 ( ), there are four basic expressions in the language that describe the truth of in time: C , which states that the agent currently knows , F , which states that the agent will know sometimes in the future, G , stating that the agent knows always in the future, and X , stating that the agent will know at the next moment in time;
these basic expressions are called temporal atoms. The set of temporal formulas is the smallest set of expressions containing the temporal atoms and closed with respect to the propositional connectives f^; :; _; !g. De nition 10 (Semantics) Let M be a (conservative) partial temporal model, and let t 2 !. Even though we want to describe the reasoning process of an agent, we are of course interested in the nal outcomes of this reasoning process. This is expressed by the limit of a partial temporal model. The minimal temporal models of a theory describe the intended possible behavior of the agent over time.
We are interested in the connections between logic programs (with the semantics of stable generated models) and theories in partial temporal logic. It turns out that there is a faithful translation of logic programs into formulas of minimal partial temporal logic. The translation will take rules in normal form to temporal formulas. We will make one additional assumption on rules in normal form. 2. Suppose M j = min trans(P). De ne I = Lit(lim M) and I t = Lit(M t ) for t 2 !. Since M is conservative, we have I 0 I 1 : : : I and I = S 1 t=0 I t . We will show that I 0 ; I 1 ; : : : is a P-stable chain.
First of all, I 0 = ;. For if not, we can de ne a partial model N by N 0 (a) = u for all atoms a and N t = M t for t > 0. It is easy to see that N < M and N j = trans(P), which contradicts the minimality of M.
Let t 2 !; we will show that I t+1 satis es the heads of all clauses whose body is satis ed in I t ; I]. Let F 1 ; : : : ; F n ) G 1 ; : : : G m be a rule in P, and suppose I t ; I] j = F 1 ; : : : ; F n . Take an F i ; if there is a b 2 Lit 0 in F i such that b 2 I t , then (M; t) j = Cb. If not, then by Lemma 9 there must be a b 2 Lit 0 such that ?b 2 F i and b 6 2 I. This means that lim M(b) 6 = 1, so (M; t) j = :Fb. In both cases we have that (M; t) j = trans(F 1 )^: : :^trans(F n ) and as M j = trans(P) it follows that (M; t) j = trans(G 1 )_: : :_trans(G m ). So, for some i it must be the case that (M; t) j = trans(G i ). . This means that N j = trans(P) which contradicts the assumption that M is a minimal model of trans(P). Therefore, such an interpretation J can not exist, and I t+1 is a minimal extension of I t satisfying the heads of applicable clauses. We have proved that I 0 ; I 1 ; : : : ; I is a P-stable chain generating I. From the de nition of stable chain it follows that I is a model of P. 2
We will give an example. It is easy to see that this model corresponds to the stable generated model of the original program and to the stable chain generating it.
The translation into temporal logic simpli es the proof of the following proposition, which continues the discussion on normal forms of section 3.
Proposition 11 For every extended general logic program P, there exists a stable equivalent program Q which is in special normal form, i.e., all its rules are of the form F 1 ; : : : ; F m ) G 1 ; : : : ; G n where the F i and G j are in XLit.
Proof: Let P EGLP. By Proposition 8, P can be transformed into a stable equivalent program P 0 in normal form. Then we can take P 0 ], the Herbrand instantiation of P 0 , and delete, for every rule, any F i in the body which contains a complementary literal pair fl; ?lg with l 2 Lit 0 . Let the result be P 00 . Now consider any rule s 2 P 00 , say s = F 1 ; : : : ; F m ) G 1 ; : : : ; G n , and suppose that Q such that trans(Q) is exactly T. This Q has special normal form. Furthermore, P is stable equivalent to P 0 , which is equivalent (stable, but also classically) to P 0 ], which is in turn equivalent to P 00 . Stable models of P 00 correspond to minimal temporal models of trans(P 00 ), which is equivalent to T (and therefore has the same minimal temporal models). But T = trans(Q), so the minimal temporal models of T correspond to stable generated models of Q. We conclude that Q is stable equivalent to P. 2
We have shown that logic programs can be translated (via a normal form) to formulas of minimal partial temporal logic in a modular way (the translation of a program is the union of the translations of its sequents). The translation preserves the semantics (in the sense of Proposition 10). But how about the other way, i.e., is there a modular translation of minimal partial temporal logic into logic programs (endowed with the stable generated semantics)? For this question to be answered positively, it is su cient (and necessary) that temporal formulas in a normal form can be translated. Essentially, the temporal language is a propositional language using the temporal atoms as its propositional atoms. Therefore, any temporal formula is equivalent to a formula in conjunctive normal form, and we may focus on the disjuncts. As only conservative models are considered, it is the case that G is equivalent to X . We may thus concentrate on disjunctions containing atoms C , :C , F , :F , X , and :X . It is easy to see that temporal operators distribute over conjunction and disjunction, e.g. C( ^ ) is equivalent to C ^C , and C( _ ) is equivalent to C _ C . This means that an atom C is equivalent to C 0 , where 0 is a conjunctive normal form (or disjunctive normal form) of . We may then distribute the C operator over the conjunctions and These models can not both correspond to stable chains of the same program. Since they have the same limit model, the same sequents are applicable with respect to ;; Lit(lim M)] as with respect to ;; Lit(lim N)]. Since fag must be an extension of the empty set satisfying the heads of clauses whose bodies is satis ed in ;; Lit(lim M)], it is impossible that fa; bg is a minimal such extension. Both of these minimal models start with a partial model corresponding to the empty set. Note that formula (4) above uses an atom :Cb on the left of the implication (corresponding to Cb in the disjunction).
Disjunctive Defaults
In this section we introduce several versions of disjunctive default logic. Disjunctive default logic is a modi cation of Reiter's default logic ( Re80] This de nition is clearly a generalization of the original x-point de nition of an extension. However, there is also a semi-constructive de nition, which is equivalent in the non-disjunctive case. It turns out that if we generalize this semi-constructive de nition (which is more in the spirit of stable generated models and minimal temporal models), we get a somewhat di erent notion (see EH97]).
De nition 15 Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults. A deductively closed set E of sentences is a generated extension of D if there is a sequence E 0 E 1 : : : E n : : : of deductively closed sets of sentences such that 1. E 0 = Cn(;); 2. E n+1 is a minimal extension of E n satisfying the following closure condition Cl gen (E): if ( : 1 ; : : : ; k = 1 j : : : j l ) 2 D, 2 E n , and : 1 ; : : : ; : k 6 2 E then f 1 ; : : : ; l g \ E n+1 6 = ;. and E = S n<! E n .
In the case of non-disjunctive defaults, both de nitions above coincide with the original de nition of Re80]. In EH97] it was shown that extensions of a disjunctive default theory in the sense of GLPT91] are generated extensions. The converse, however, is not true.
Example 4 This corresponds to the earlier example, D = f(: = ajb) (a : = b) ( : :a = a)g. Then E = Cn(fa; bg) is a generated extension of D: E 0 = Cn(;), E 1 = Cn(fag), E 2 = Cn(fa; bg). But E is not an extension. It does satisfy the closure condition with respect to itself, but Cn(fbg) also satis es it, so Min E (D) = fCn(fbg)g.
In the remaining part of this section we investigate relations between default logic and extended generalized logic programs. There is a simple relation between normal logic programs and a class of special default theories (see GL90]). In EH97] it is shown that every super logic program P (see Prz96]) can be translated into a default theory tr(P) such that the generated extensions of tr(P) and the stable generated models of P coincide in a well-de ned sense. We recall this result. Let r := a 1 ; : : : ; a l ; :K 1 ; : : : ; :K m ) c 1 ; : : : ; c n be a super rule; where K j = b j 1^: : :^b j p j , for 1 j m. We translate such a rule to the following disjunctive default rule: tr(r) := (a 1^: : :^a l : :K 1 ; : : : ; :K m = c 1 j : : : jc n ). Let At(E) = fa : a is a ground atom with E j = ag. Proposition 12 Let P be a super logic program, tr(P) the default theory given by the above translation of P. If a set I of ground atoms is a stable generated model of P then there is a generated extension E of tr(P) such that I = At(E). If E is a generated extension of tr(P), then At(E) is a stable generated model of P.
Obviously, every disjunctive default theory of a special form can be translated faithfully into a super logic program.
We now consider more complex logic programs and defaults and use for this purpose the framework of partial logic with two negations. We want to embed default logic in stable generated semantics of extended generalized logic programs. In contrast to default logic, logic programming on the one hand is based on partial logic, and on the other hand commits to disjunctions. Therefore, we need a new version of the notion of an extension of a default theory. We use partial logic with one negation (:) over coherent partial interpretations whose closure operation we have denoted by C 0 (see section 2). A set X is said to be constructively closed if C 0 (X) = X.
Lemma 13 Let X be a set of literals and a propositional sentence from L(_;^; :). Then: 2 C 0 (X) , X j = .
Proof: The claim of this lemma follows from the fact that X is a (partial) model of C 0 (X). 1 . 2
For a set X of sentences from L(_;^; :), let Lit(X) be the set of literals which are members of X.
De nition 16 Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults. A constructively closed set E of sentences is a constructively generated extension of D if there is a sequence E 0 E 1 : : : E n : : : of constructively closed sets of sentences such that 1. E 0 = C 0 (;); 2. E n+1 is a minimal constructively closed extension of E n satisfying the following closure condition Cl cgen (E): if ( : 1 ; : : : ; k = 1 j : : : j l ) 2 D, 2 E n , and : 1 ; : : : ; : k 6 2 E then i 2 C 0 (Lit(E n+1 )) for some 1 i l.
1 This is not true for Cn(X).
3. E = S n<! E n .
The language in which defaults are expressed, contains classical negation (:), whereas logic programs contain weak (?) and strong ( ) negation. Semantically, classical negation should correspond to strong negation. When translating sentences from the classical language to the language of logic programming, all classical negations should therefore be replaced by strong negation (and vice versa when translating the other way). To avoid notational clutter, we will not explicitly show this translation. The reader is instructed to change classical negation signs to strong negation when moving from the default language to logic programming (and vice versa).
Let d := ( : 1 ; : : : ; n = 1 j : : : j l ) be a default rule. De ne lp(d) = ; ? 1 ; : : : ; ? n ) 1 ; : : : ; l and lp(D) = flp(d)jd 2 Dg. We will show that this provides a faithfull embedding of default logic based on constructively generated extensions, into logic programming based on stable generated models. We rst prove a lemma.
Lemma 14 Let I 0 I 1 : : : be a sequence of Herbrand interpretations with I = S n<! I n , and let E 0 E 1 : : : be a sequence of constructively closed sets of sentences with E = S n<! E n . For a set of (disjunctive) defaults D, de ne n = fs 2 lp(D) j I n ; I] j = Bsg n = fd 2 D j if d = ( : 1 ; : : : ; k = 1 j : : : j l ) then 2 E n and : 1 ; : : : ; : k 6 2 Eg If E n = C 0 (I n ) for all n < !, then n = fd j lp(d) 2 n g; n = 1; 2; 3 : : : Proof: Suppose d 2 n , with d = ( : 1 ; : : : ; k = 1 j : : : j l ). Then 2 E n = C 0 (I n ), so I n j = which implies I n ; I] j = (since does not contain weak negation). Furthermore, : 1 ; : : : ; : k 6 2 E = C 0 (I) (this last equality is easily checked). Thus, we have I 6 j = : 1 ; : : : ; : k so I j = ? 1 ; : : : ; ? k from which it follows that I n ; I] j = ? 1 ; : : : ; ? k . We have proved that I n ; I] j = B(lp(d)), so lp(d) 2 n .
Conversely, suppose that lp(d) 2 n . If, again, d = ( : 1 ; : : : ; k = 1 j : : : j l ), then I n ; I] j = ; ? 1 ; : : : ; ? k . It follows that I n j = , so 2 E n . As I n ; I] j = ? 1 ; : : : ; ? k , we have that I 6 j = : 1 ; : : : ; : k . Proof: 1. Let E be a constructively generated extension of lp(D) then there is a sequence E 0 E 1 : : : E n : : :, E = S i<! E i satisfying the conditions of De nition 16. Let I n = Lit(E n ). We show that (I n ) n<! is a stable chain for lp(D) generating I = Lit(E). Obviously, I 0 = ;, since Lit(E 0 ) = ;. It is easy to check that E n = C 0 (I n ) so we may apply Lemma 14. Suppose I n ; I] j = B(lp(d)), for d = ( : 1 ; : : : ; n = 1 j : : : j l ). Then lp(d) 2 n+1 , so d 2 n+1 . As E is a constructively generated extension, i 2 E n+1 for some 1 i l. But this implies that Lit(E n+1 ) j = i , so I n+1 j = i , yielding I n+1 j = W H(lp(d)).
I n+1 is also minimal with this property: assume, I n J I n+1 and J satis es the heads of the sequents in the set n+1 . Then, C 0 (J) satis es the condition Cl cgen (E), and since E n+1 is by assumption minimal, it follows J = I n+1 .
2. Let I be stable generated model of lp(D), I = S n<! I n , (I n ) n<! a stable chain. Let E n = C 0 (I n ); we show that E = S n<! E n is a constructively generated extension of D.
Obviously, E 0 = C 0 (;). We have to show: E n+1 is a minimal extension of E n satisfying the closure condition Cl cgen (E). Let d 2 D, d := ( : 1 ; : : : ; m = 1 j : : : j l ), 2 C 0 (E n ), and : 1 ; : : : ; : m 6 2 E. Using Lemma 14, d 2 n so lp(D) 2 n . As I is a stable generated model, I n+1 j = i for some 1 i l. From this one concludes i 2 C 0 (I n+1 ) , so i 2 E n+1 . E n+1 is a minimal extension with the closure property Cl cgen (E). Assume, E n E 0 E n+1 , E 0 satis es Cl cgen (E). Then it holds I n Lit(E 0 ) I n+1 . Since (I n ) n<! is a stable chain it follows Lit(E 0 ) = I n+1 , hence E 0 = C 0 (Lit(E 0 )) = E n+1 .
2.
It is not clear whether there exists a natural translation of arbitrary extended logic programs into default logic with constructively generated extensions; it seems that this default mechanism is more restricted than extended generalized logic programs. But, for a special class of extended logic programs this can be done. Let r = F 1 ; : : : ; F m ; ? G 1 ; ? G n ) H 1 ; : : : ; H s be a program rule such that the formulas F i ; G j ; H l do not contain weak negation. Programs consisting of rules of this kind are called extended normal disjunctive logic programs. Note that this is a real restriction. All sequents of EGLP have the normal form of Proposition 8. In a sequent in normal form, there may be weakly negated literals in the head, and in the body, literals from Lit 0 and weakly negated literals may simultaneously occur in one of the conjuncts. In extended normal disjunctive logic programs, both of these possibilities may not occur.
We de ne the following translation into default logic:
def(r) = F 1^: : :^F m : G 1 ; : : : ; G n =H 1 _ : : : _ H k For a set P of program rules of this form let def(P) = fdef(r); r 2 Pg. Proposition 16 Let P be a normal extended disjunctive logic program and def(P) its default translation. If the set E of sentences is a constructively generated extension of def(P) then Lit(E) is a stable generated model of P. Conversely, for every stable generated model I of P there is a strongly generated extension E of def(P) such that Lit(E) = I. In both cases, the sequences generating I, respectively E, are pointwise corresponding in the sense of Proposition 15.
Proof: From Proposition 15, we know that constructively generated extensions of def(P) correspond to the stable generated models of lp(def(P)). By Lemma 4 we may transform lp(def(P)) = F 1^: : :^F m ; ? G 1 ; : : : ; ? G n ) H 1 _ : : : _ H k into the rule F 1 ; : : : ; F m ; ? G 1 ; ? G n ) H 1 ; : : : ; H s without changing the stable generated semantics. But this latter rule is just the original rule r! We have proved that the constructively generated extensions of def(P) correspond to the stable generated models of P. D) ). This means that for constructively generated extensions, we do not need disjunctive defaults. This result should not come as a surprise, since constructively closed sets must commit to one of the disjuncts.
Conclusion
Generalizing the approach of EH97] we investigated the relations between stable generated models and minimal partial temporal models. A translation was given from programs into theories in partial temporal logic, which preserves semantics. Furthermore, we introduced the notions of (constructively) generated extensions of a disjunctive default theory and studied embedddings of default theories in logic programming and vice versa.
This established a close relation between three di erent approaches to non-monotonic reasoning: (disjunctive) default logic, stable generated models of logic programs and minimal temporal partial models. In all three approaches there is a notion of generating conclusions starting from scratch, on the basis of the nal outcomes. This connection adds further evidence to the naturalness of stable generated models as a possible semantics for generalized logic programs.
